INTRODUCTION
Islamic movements seeking to create an Islamic state and using violent means have long captured the attention of world media and the burgeoning research on political Islam. A wide range of Muslims who prefer democracy and commit to play by the rules instead, have been downplayed by the preponderant focus of the field, which fetishes radicals spreading terror abroad and authoritarianism at home. Muslim communities in the Balkans, who after the fall of Communism have embraced democracy and European integration as the end goals of regime change, are particularly missing in scholarly research on political Islam. If we heard about them, it was usually in the context of ethnonational conflicts during the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Poulton and Taji-Farouki 1997) and the intrusion of foreign missionaries who came in to diffuse their own message of Islam (Deliso 2007 ). Yet, almost no research so far has been conducted on how, and indeed why, Muslims in the Balkans have engaged with the ongoing processes of postCommunist democratization, which in the regional context have been increasingly framed by the narrative of return to Europe and the concrete process of accession to the European Union (EU).
This article analyzes how the Muslim community has engaged with, and has contributed to, parallel processes of democratization and European accession in post-Communist Albania. The country is a crucial case for the purpose of analyzing Muslims' choices for democracy because of several reasons. First, it is the only Muslim-majority country that emerged in Europe after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 1 and has since, perhaps more than any other country in the Balkans, been under continuous pressure to confirm its European credentials (Clayer 2009a) . Second, it is one of the few Muslim-majority polities, which has univocally embraced democracy as the end goal of regime change and has embarked upon a steady process of democratic transformation since the fall of Communism in the early 1990s (Elbasani 2013 ). Last but not least, with the collapse of Communist regime the country has become subject to different, and sometimes controversial, incoming foreign ideas and agendas on the role of Islam in the postcommunist polity (Lakshman-Lepain 2002) . This particular experience of democratization thus enables us to investigate how the Muslim majority has positioned itself on crucial challenges of post-Communist democratization; why it has selected some foreign influences and neutralized others among the options willing to come to its "rescue"; and what explains Muslims' recasting of religion in line with the broad democratic and European aspirations of the Albanian polity.
The analysis of democratization, and Muslims' respective choices, are divided into two different periods, namely democratic transition (1990-1998 and democratic consolidation (1998-2013) , each presenting democratizing actors, including Muslim groups, with different challenges and issues. Whereas the first stage of democratization consisted of choosing and building democracy as the antithesis of Communist dictatorship, the subsequent stages entailed the consolidation of the feeble institutional framework and evolved in a manner closely connected to the processes of EU integration. The assessment of Muslims' choices on crucial issues facing the Albanian polity focuses on the central organization, the Albanian Muslim Community (AMC), which is recognized by the state as the only authority on all administrative and spiritual issues pertinent to the community of Sunni believers, and which serves as the main hub of religious activities.
The argument proceeds in four sections. The first section summarizes alternative 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS ON MUSLIMS' CHOICE FOR

DEMOCRACY
Current research on the moderation of Muslims' political claims and their preferences for democracy, revolve around two major alternative approaches, one focusing on the rationality of religious behaviour and the other on the ideological confines of religious behaviour. In the first approach, Muslims are considered as strategic power seekers who calculate their political choices according to the structure of opportunities and constraints embedded in the broad institutional framework and changes thereto (Bellin 2008) .
Indeed, changes of institutional setting, and in particular, democratic openings that permit formerly excluded groups to compete for market shares "induce" Muslim organizations to reshuffle their positions and adapt to the gives and takes of democratic rules (Kalywas 2000).
In the second alternative Muslims' primary commitments are to their doctrine, and their behaviour hinges on the role of democratic ideas in core religious teachings and interpretations thereof (Philpott 2007) . Learning opportunities -be it via life experiences, exposure to new ideas or collaboration with others -enable religious leaders to recast religious doctrine according to conditions of time and place and possibly take on board democratic principles and aspirations (Wickham 2004) . The recasting of religious ideas in line with moderate/democratic rules might involve strategic choices, i.e. learning to avoid red-line theological issues, which have previously placed religious organizations and leaders into trouble with state authorities and/or which have little appeal amongst large sections of the population. Both rational and ideological drivers of religious behaviour might involve some common rational-strategic shift of behaviour, but learning differs from swift adaptation to institutional changes to the extent it connotes a more gradual and lengthier process of habituation to new institutional models and rules (Schwedler 2011 ).
Still, just as Muslims' strategic choice for democracy in response to swift institutional changes makes them susceptible, and somehow shallow, actors of democratization, leaders' recasting of religious doctrines are similarly vulnerable to ideological thresholds précised in sharia law or diverse theological debates and authoritative structures.
Religious groups, leaders and authorities must, therefore, possess valid intellectual sources to legitimize new political interpretations in order to be able to convince the rank and file of the believers (Tezcur 2010 (Kuru 2007) .
THE POST-COMMUNIST RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS
AND LEGACIES
The 
Re-born Muslim Organizations: Centralized Hierarchies and Foreign Networks
The granting Yet, the vacuum left by the destruction of the former atheist regime proved very difficult to refill. Communists' attacks on the religious establishment, the progressive elimination of politically independent clergy, the gradual prohibition of religious institutions and practices, and later in 1976 the constitutional ban on religion, had left religious hierarchies in a totally inept situation (Prifti 1978, 153) . After decades of fierce atheist policies, few clergy and knowledge of theology had survived, books and teaching material were rare, money was scarce, the confiscated property was not returned, and even the ritual practices that nourish religious traditions were largely lost.
Given the lack of internal sources of recovery -religious authorities, knowledge and ideas -the revival of religious organizations was almost entirely dependent upon foreign associations and funds willing to come to their rescue. Substantial foreign aid, which initially poured in through cash-rich Arab NGOs, was instrumental for the regeneration The old leaders of the AMC considered it a sacred "duty" to carry on "the national traditions inherited from their ancestors" (Dizdari and Luli 2003, 5) . The notion of Albanian tradition is usually articulated in contrast to the "foreign", "intolerant", and "radical" imports from Middle Eastern organizations and Albanian graduates of theology abroad (Sinani 2010, 8) . The main ideological pillars of tradition, however, are rooted in the institutional solutions and ideas that characterised the founding of the Albanian independent state in the early 20 th century (Clayer 2009a, 406-423) . Back then, selected 
POST-COMMUNIST DEMOCRATIZATION: PHASES AND CHALLENGES
Since the fall of Communism Albania has gone through different waves of democratization and de-democratization, featuring institutional progress, but also significant periods of stagnation coupled with recurrent crises of order and legitimacy.
The advances and challenges of country's difficult transition can be analytically separated into two major stages, namely democratic transition (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) , and democratic consolidation (1998-to present), each presenting potential democratizing actors, including the revived Muslim majority, with different issues and problems to face in the course of the difficult and prolonged democratization.
The gradual collapse of the one party-state dictatorship in the early 1990s saw the complex "opening up" of one of the most rigid totalitarian constructs ever built in the Communist world (Prifti 1999) . On the eve of transition, the country was widely seen as an outlier amongst other Communist countries, to the extent it lacked both agency-and structurally-related conditions that could facilitate regime change (Elbasani 2007) .
Communists' harsh purges on their opponents had destroyed all of the individual and collective sources of dissidence, who could furnish alternative ideas, mount an organized resistance, and lead the country towards democratic transition (Vickers and Pettifer 2000, 31-34) . The ruling Communists, meanwhile, were determined to preserve the main pillars of Hoxha's totalitarian construct, copied faithfully from the Stalinist oppressive model of the 1930s. Given the lack of organized dissidence on the one hand, and Communists' determination to hold on power on the other, the impulses of change could only come from unorganized and spontaneous popular movements dissatisfied with the regime. 
MUSLIMS' ENGAGEMENT WITH DEMOCRATIZATION
Organized Support for the Anti-Communist Political Alternative
During the initial democratic openings, oppressed Muslims, like all the other religious communities, shared dissidents' urge for the expansion of human rights and freedoms negated by the Communist dictatorship. Thus, they found a close partner in the emerging anti-Communist movements that gradually challenged the regime. (Vickers and Pettifer 2000, 102) . Soon after the 1992 elections, a delegation from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was invited to the country to arrange its membership in the bank, a deal which was negotiated together with generous funding for Islamic education and scholarships for Albanian students to study in Islamic countries.
By the end of 1992, DP's leader and new elected president of the country, Berisha, decreed the country's membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The decision was followed by a unilateral abolition of visa requirements for all OIC citizens.
The government also appealed to private Saudi investors for multi-million dollar credits to sponsor the collapsing economy. 2 Open policies towards Muslims allowed the intrusion of diverse radical external organizations who, besides cash brought also controversial ideas, individuals and networks into the country. To paraphrase a study of that period, "when the Communist law was swept aside, … Albania was invaded once again: by business prospectors, 'advisors' of all kinds, observers and religious groups who came to recruit for their faiths" (Young 1997: 5) . Competition for the "hearts and minds" of post-atheist Albanians was particularly fierce in the context of the country's location in Europe and its mixed religious composition, which made the Muslim population a crucial target for global Islamists to diffuse their message inside of Europe.
Indeed, the country soon came to face the danger of "Islamic fundamentalism", as foreign networks used formal and informal political links to engage in illicit profit-making activities and expand operational bases related to terrorist networks elsewhere in Europe (Vickers and Pettifer 2000: 106-107) .
The AMC, for its part, capitalized on increasing political opportunities and generous foreign assistance to regenerate the role of Islam in the country. As the Chief Mufti noted back in 1993, "the democratic victory of 1990 has created new chances to connect with the world, develop new thinking, renew attempts to strengthen faith and discover religious morality" (Dizdari and Luli 2003, p. 9) . At the same time, however, the centralized AMC structures made extensive use of the reformist arguments inherited from the past to contravene radical foreign influences. The response of one the high-level AMC leaders, Faik Hoxha, to the Saudi Minister of Vakifs is symptomatic of AMC's approach and defence of the traditional line: "We do not need others to teach us faith because we have had ours for 500 years. We need your economic assistance for the regeneration of our own faith" (quoted in Sytari 2011, p. 46) .
The theme of religious tolerance and moderation, carried from the pre-Communist reformist tradition, continued to be a persistent thread within the regenerated postCommunist religious discourses. Particularly arguments of "national unity", "patriotism", and "religious tolerance", which were envisaged and de facto worked, to glue the multi- any clashes involving religion, the official representatives of the main communities were careful to publically condemn the incidents and march together in demonstration of religious tolerance and unity (Demetja, 2010) . The prevailing discourse on Albanians'
historical peaceful cohabitation and tolerance has, thus, provided Muslim leaders with valid sources and arguments to neutralize confrontational ideas and restrain the faithful.
Muslims' Commitment to the New Turn of Democratization and EU Integration
The return of Socialist governments (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) in Albania is neither a residential religion, nor a faith spread originally…. As a rule, it is a shallow religion." (2005) . Furthermore, Islamic-related symbols are commonly used as a political tool to denigrate opponents and present them as "anti-European" forces. As a result, Albanian Muslims find themselves "in the situation of numerical majority but intellectual, social and political minority situation" indeed, a kind of "surviving majority" (Clayer 2003, 19) . nations ruled by liberty, justice and service to people" (Shekulli, 2005) . 
